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COMMENTS
THE RIGHT OF A PAID SURETY TO SUBROGATION
Bank of Fort MV1ill v. Lawyer's Title Insurance Corp., 268 F. 2d 313
(4th Cir. 1959), is a recent case raising the question of whether a paid
surety may recover against a so-called "innocent" third party under the
equitable doctrine of subrogation. Plaintiff issued a policy to Loan
Association guaranteeing it against loss by reason of defects in title to
real estate described in a mortgage. The mortgage was forged by Attorney, and was offered to secure a loan from Loan Association. Attorney
also forged the check issued by Loan Association, and deposited the proceeds to his own account. In due course defendant drawee bank received
the check and made payment. Upon discovery of the fraud, plaintiff
paid Loan Association the amount of the "loss" under the terms of its
policy, and took an asignment from it of all its claims or causes of action
arising out of the fraudulent transaction. Plaintiff then brought this
action against the defendant drawee bank, claiming to be subrogated to
Loan Association's cause of action against its drawee for reimbursement
of the drawer's account to the extent of the forged check. Held: For
defendant drawee bank. Subrogation is an equitable doctrine, not a
matter of right. Since the equities of the innocent, non-negligent defendant bank are not inferior to those of the plaintiff, who was paid to
accept the risk, subrogation will not be allowed. Plaintiff not being entitled to subrogation, its position is not improved by the assignment to
it of the insured's cause of action against the drawee bank.'
Despite the general rule that, upon payment of a loss, an insurer
(or insurers in the case of coinsurance) is entitled to be subrogated
pro tanto to any right of action which the insured may have had against
a third person whose negligence or wrongful act caused the loss,2 the
result reached in the foregoing decision represents what is unquestionably the overwhelming majority view on the present issue. In its simplest terms, the majority rule states flatly that a compensated surety
(insurer) will not be allowed to enforce a right or claim, as subrogee,
against a party which was not negligent or actually at fault, even though
the later is otherwise legally liable. Most of these cases appear to be
based upon the premise that because the surety has been paid for the
sole purpose of assuming the very risk which, in fact, did occur, its
position or standing in a court of equity, where it is attempting to enforce its rights on the basis of the equitable doctrine of subrogation, is
inferior as against a defendant who is legally liable, albeit not actually
3
at fault. Its equities will be deemed inferior.
Bank of Fort Mill v. Lawyer's Title Insurance Corp., 268 F.2d 313 (4th Cir.
1959).
229A Am. Jur. Insurance §1719 (1960).
3 United States Fid. & Guar. Co. v. First Nat. Bank in Dallas, 172 F.2d 258
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For the sake of simplicity, the problem is best broken down into
two main categories. Variations off the main theme will often appear
within each, but general principles should remain steadfast throughout.
In the first category, the obligation of both the principal and surety
may be considered identical, except that the obligation of the principal
is primary, that of the surety only secondary. Two examples may conveniently be given: 1) A, depositor, requires his bank, B, to furnish a
"bond" to protect his deposits therein. C, surety, furnishes the bond.
Obviously B is primarily liable on the debt, the deposit, while C, upon
furnishing the bond, becomes only secondarily liable to A on the same
debt. B is truly the principal. Or, also within the confines of the same
category: 2) A, employer, may be furnished a bond by C, surety, protecting A against dishonesty by his employee B. Here again it is apparent that C is secondarily liable only, but still on the same underlying
obligation as B, the principal.- In the event of default by B in either
of the foregoing instances, the majority of courts have readily permitted the surety, C, to be subrogated to all of the rights of the depositor, A, in the first illustration, or the employer, A, in the second, against
the defaulting principal,B. Each of these cases represents a manifest
compliance with the familiar principle of subrogation that a surety who
has been compelled to pay the obligations of a defaulting principal
possesses stronger equities than his principal, and is entitled to be subrogated against him. By virtue of his default, the courts simply deem
the "equities" of the principal inferior to those of the surety, and the fact
that the surety may have been compensated for assuming the risk is no
longer material. To allow the defaulting principal, the party primarily
(5th Cir. 1949); American Sur. Co. v. Bank of California, 133 F.2d 160
(9th Cir. 1943); Washington Mechanics Savings Bank v. District Title Insurance Co., 65 F.2d 827 (D.C. Cir. 1933); New York Title & Mortgage Co.
v. First Nat. Bank, 51 F.2d 485 (8th Cir. 1931); National Sur. Co. v. Arosin,
198 Fed. 605 (8th Cir. 1912); Hensley-Johnson Motors v. Citizens Nat. Bank,
122 Cal. App. 2d 22, 264 P.2d 973 (1953); J. G. Boswell v. W. D. Felder
& Co., 103 Cal. App. 2d 767, 230 P.2d 386 (1951) ; Jones v. Bank of America
Nat. Trust & Savings Assn., 49 Cal. App. 2d 115, 121 P.2d 94 (1942); American Alliance Insurance Co. v. Capitol Nat. Bank, 75 Cal. App. 2d 787, 171
P.2d 449 (1946) ; Meyers v. Bank of America, 11 Cal. 2d 92, 77 P.2d 1084
(1938); National Cas. Co. v. Caswell & Co., 317 Ill. App. 66, 45 N.E.2d 698
(1942) ; Louisville Trust Co. v. Royal Indemnity Co., 230 Ky. 482, 20 S.W2d
71 (1929); Oxford Production Credit Assn. v. Bank of Oxford, 196 Miss.
50, 16 So.2d 384 (1944); National Surety Corp. v. Edward House Co., 191
Miss. 884, 4 So.2d 340 (1941); American Bonding Co. v. State Say. Bank,
47 Mont. 332, 133 Pac. 367 (1913) ; Northern Trust Co. v. Consolidated Elevator Co., 142 Minn. 132, 171 N.W. 265, and American Central Ins. Co. v.
Weller, 106 Or. 494, 212 Pac. 803 (1923).
-Though if B himself does not take out the bond, which is the rule rather
than the exception, it must be said that he is a principal but in a loose sense
of the word. This has been described as a non-consensual suretyship by one
writer. See Campbell, Non-Consensual Suretyship, 45 Yale L. J. 69 (1935).
The courts do not appear to have made a distinction when dealing with the
rights of the surety to be subrogated against the employee in cases of his
defalcation.
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liable on the obligation, to escape unscathed would result in clear unjust enrichment. 5
The second of the categories alluded to above is exemplified by the
Bank of Fort Mill decision, supra.6 The most significant distinction
between the two arises from the fact that in the Fort Mill situation the
obligations of the surety (or insurer) and the defendant bank are not
identical. To the contrary, the obligations are separate and distinct, and
both are essentially primary. This is to say that the defendant bank is
obligated to A, its depositor, solely by virtue of its contract of deposit;
whereas C, the surety, is obligated to A on its forgery policy only.
Neither of the obligations is related to the other in any manner, and,
absent the "paid surety" defense, the obligation of neither obligator is
contingent upon the existence or defaulted performance of the other.
The addition of but one further element to the first category, then,
can set the stage for the introduction of the "paid surety" defense.
Thus, if in the second illustration a check or other negotiable instrument belonging to A and had been forged by employee B, and
then cashed by A's bank,7 A would be in a position to seek recovery
from either of two sources. A could go against his bank on the contract of deposit for paying on the forged instrument; or A could look
to his surety, C, on the forgery policy. Should A decide to recover
from his surety, C, and should B be unavailable or insolvent (either or
both of which commonly appear, for obvious reasons), then C, upon
payment of the loss, has recourse only against A's depository bank.
However, as stated above, the right to subrogation is now asserted not
against a defaulting principal, on the same obligation, but rather, it is
against a third person, the depository bank, which is liable to A on its
own obligation, the contract of deposit. To the majority of courts, this
difference, at least to the surety, is insurmountable.8 The issue has re5 RESTATEMENT,

RESTITUTION §162 (1937): "where the property of one person
is used in discharging an obligation owed by another ... under such circumstances that the other would be unjustly enriched by the retention of the
benefit thus conferred, the former is entitled to be subrogated to the position
of the obligee ...
6 Supra, note 1.
7 It would seem that similar considerations become involved by hypothecating
C, insurer of the bank, proceeding against a prior indorser of the forged instrument.
s See American Surety Co. v. Bank of California, 133 F.2d 160, 162 (9th Cir.
1943) where the court expressed the view: "The right of subrogation is a
creature of equity, applicable where one person is required to pay a debt for
which another is primarily responsible, and which the latter should in equity
discharge. In theory one person is substituted to the claim of another. BUT
ONLY

WHEN

THE

EQUITIES

AS

BETWEEN

THE

PARTIES

PREPONDERATE

IN

FAVOR OF THE PLAINTIFF. That is, a surety's right of recovery from a third

party through subrogation does not follow, as of course, upon proof that the
losing but recompensed party could have recovered from the third party.
Accordingly, SUBROGATION WILL NOT OPERATE AGAINST AN INNOCENT PERSON
WRONGED BY THE PRINCIPAL'S FRAUD. A surety may pursue the independent

right of action of the original creditor against a third person, but it must
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solved itself then to the question of whether the surety has any right
to be subrogated to the contractual rights of its insured against this
third party; and if so, in what manner.
It has been suggested that there are three possible solutions to the
problem:
(1) To prohibit recovery by the surety against the third person, who is thus in effect given the benefit of insurance on which
he has not paid any premium and where there is no direct contractual or other relationship between him and the surety.
(2) To allow the insured to recover from both the surety and
third party and thus to be doubly indemnified-a situation which
the law has always deemed contrary to public policy not only by
by reason of its unfairness but because of its incitement to fraud.
(3) To give the surety the benefit of the contractual obligation of the insured against the third party by allowing subrogation. 9
Still a fourth alternative has been advanced, though to the knowledge
of this writer never adopted, to the effect that the party first discharging
the obligation should be entitled to contributive subrogation against the
other.' 0 Thus the surety-insurer and the defendant bank could effectively divide the loss.
In the light of the aforementioned majority rule that subrogation will
not lie against an "innocent" third person wronged by the fraud of the
principal, it is proper here to mention that the converse of the rule is
also true. It is the almost universal rule that when the third party has
been negligent, or has knowingly participated in the original wrong,
such conduct will be sufficient to balance the "equities" in favor of
the paid surety. As is made amply clear by the court in Bank of
Fort Mill, the payment of instruments on which indorsements have
been forged is not such negligence as to raise any equities in favor of
the surety. But where the bank has allowed a diversion of the depositor's funds despite cognizance of some irregularity, equities have been
found in favor of the surety so as to uphold its claim to subrogation.".
appear that said third person participated in the wrongful act involved or that

he was negligent, for the right to recover from a third person is merely conditional in contrast to the right to recover from the principal which is absolute." [emphasis supplied].
9 Standard Accident Insurance Company v. Pellecchia, 15 N.J. 162, 104 A.2d
288, 302 (1954).
10 See Langmaid, Some Recent Subrogation Problems in the Law of Suretyship
and Insurance,47 Harv. L. R. 976 (1934).
"American National Bank v. Fidelity & D. Co., 129 Ga. 126, 58 S.E. 867 (1907),
where the bank knowingly allowed funds of the bankrupt in hands of the
receiver to be withdrawn without proper countersign; Richfield National
Bank v. American Surety Bank, 39 F.2d 387 (8th Cir. 1930), where defendant
bank had knowledge of misappropriation of funds by school treasurer; Carroll
County Bank v. Rhodes, 69 Ark 43, 63 S.W. 68 (1900), where defendant
bank accepted funds of sheriff with knowledge that they did not belong to
him, but to the county, and had paid funds out on a check given in payment
of the sheriff's private debt, and Farmers' & T. Bank v. Fidelity & Deposit
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Implicit in such decisions would seem to be a recognition that rules
imposing liability upon a particular party, most commonly a bank, in
the field of negotiable instruments, or in fiduciary relationships, are
founded upon an almost indispensable public policy; and, although from
a viewpoint of moral culpability oftentimes severe, should be waived
only to avoid real injustice or hardship. 12 Since the activity of the
bank in these cases is instrumental in the achievement of the fraudulent purpose, there is no substantial injustice done by holding it liable
to the full extent of the loss.
What, then, of the situation where the third party is neither negligent, nor a knowing participant in the fraud of the principal-the
second of our main categories. As shown by Bank of Fort Mill,13 this
has been the source of all the controversy. Unquestionably, if it be
assumed that the fraud is the cause of the loss, the very fact that the
party against whom liability is sought to be enforced is not in any degree the cause of the fraud, itself makes a finding in favor of the
surety with respect to subrogation less compelling. But is the basic
assumption correct? It is the theory of negotiable instruments law
that when one deposits money on general deposit with a bank, a relationship whereby the bank becomes the debtor of the depositor for
the amount so deposited results. With this relationship, the bank implicitly undertakes to pay the money either to the depositor himself or
to someone to whom he directs it to be paid. Necessarily then, assuming the depositor does nothing to give rise to an estoppel, when the
drawee has debited the account of the drawer of an instrument, bearing a forged or other unauthorized indorsement of any holder whose
indorsement was required for the transfer of title, the drawer has the
right to have his account reimbursed to the amount paid out by the
drawee. The contract of deposit unmistakeably prohibits any effective
debit of the depositor's account.' 4 Liability to the depositor cannot be
avoided since it is no defense for the bank to show that it paid out the
money in good faith on the mistaken belief that the person presenting
the check was one authorized by the depositor to sign it and draw out
the money, when in fact he was not.' 5 Even the fact of the drawer's
Co., 108 Ky. 384, 56 S.W. 671 (1900), in which the surety of a trustee was

allowed to recover against defendant bank which had knowingly allowed
trust funds to be used in settlement of a personal debt which the trustee
owed the bank. See also Annot. 77 A.L.R. 1057 (1932).
12See Merrill, Banker's Liability for Deposits of A Fiduciary to His Personal
Account, 40 Harv. L. R. 1077 (1927).
"3Supra,
note 1.
4
1 The drawee bank paying a depositor's check on a forged indorsement is
held to have paid it out of its own funds and cannot charge the payment to
the depositor's account. See Metropolitan Casualty Ins. Co. v. First Nat.
Bank in Detroit, 261 Mich. 450, 246 N.W. 178 (1933), and Land Title & Trust
Co. v. Northwestern Nat. Bank, 196 Pa. 230, 46 Atl. 420 (1900).
'5 In Denbigh v. First Nat. Bank of Seattle, 102 Wash. 546, 174 Pac. 475, 478
(1918) the court said: "The implied contract between the bank and its de-
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negligence will not generally defeat a recovery by the drawee bank
against the collecting bank.' 6 In short, therefore, it can be said that
the liability of the bank paying the forged instrument is "absolute" and
not predicated upon negligence at all. Unquestionably these factors
have played a role in the decisions of the majority. The question is
whether the result is sound. It is submitted that it is not, and that it
7
ignores more fundamental considerations.1
Most fundamental of all is, perhaps, the objection that no ultimate
or irretrievable loss has been visited upon the holder of negotiable
paper payable to order when it is stolen from him and forged. He
remains the holder, and neither the paper itself nor the obligation giving rise to it can be discharged, by payment or otherwise, pursuant to
the forgery. The assumption of "loss" caused by the forgery is therefore predicated upon a supposition that, irresistably, the paper will
clear to the drawee, be paid, and that all parties will treat the transaction as a closed one. While in a purely practical sense, this assumption may prove true in many cases; nevertheless, in a strict legal sense
there will be a "loss" to the holder only because some aspect of waiver
or estoppel intervenes to make it so. This is to say that a drawer
(holder) really suffers no loss unless he has estopped himself to assert
positor is that the bank -will pay out the funds of the depositor only upon
order from the depositor to that effect. It follows then, that if the bank pays
out funds upon the instrument purporting to be the check of the depositor,
the signature upon which turns out to be a forgery, no right exists in the bank
to charge the amount of the item against the account of the depositor, since
the payment was wholly without any authority from him. This is elementary,
and needs the citation of no authorities."
16 State Bank v. Mid-City Trust & Savings Bank, 232 Il1. App. 186 (1924). Note
that the fact such action is based upon a restitutional theory of mutual mistake of fact, as opposed to a breach of the contract of deposit, the liabiilty
remains the same. "Under the Negotiable Instruments Law, an indorser of a
check without qualification warrants to all subsequent holders that the instrument is genuine and in all respects what it purports to be, that he has
good title to it, that all prior parties had capacity to contract, that the instrument is at the time of his indorsement valid and subsisting, and he engages that on due presentment it will be paid, and that if it is not paid he
will pay the amount thereof to the holder or to any subsequent indorser who
may be compelled to pay it. Each subsequent indorser of the checks becomes
liable to subsequent indorsers under his or its warranties and engagements."
Boserine v. Maryland Casualty Co., 112 F.2d 409, 415 (8th Cir. 1940). See
also Home Ins. Co. v. Mercantile Trust Co., 219 Mo. App. 645, 284 S.W. 834
(1926). The rule would simply seem to be that if the court is willing to
apply the "paid surety" defense, then it will apply it to the restitutional action
by the insurer of the drawee against a prior indorser of the instrument also.
17 Obviously this is not meant as an objection to the result of cases involving
a contract whereby everyone is to be indemnified for any loss suffered. Thus
where the liability of the surety is not alone to the insured, but either by
the terms of the bond or the requirement of statute is also to ANYONE who
should suffer loss by reason of misconduct, it would be absurd to allow the
surety to be subrogated to the rights of one whom it had indemnified against
another who, if compelled to pay, would have a right to recover from the
surety what he had been compelled to pay. American Bonding Co. v. Welts,
193 Fed. 978 (9th Cir. 1912) ; American Bonding Co. v. State Savings Bank,
47 Mont. 332, 133 Pac. 367 (1913), and Stewart v. Commonwealth, 104 Ky.
489, 47 S.W. 332 (1898).
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his claim against his bank, since no payment on a forged instrument
can effect his account in any manner. Indeed, the technical verity of
this can lead only to the conclusion that, under the circumstances, no
compensable loss has occurred under the policy. Since no loss, to what
can the surety claim to be subrogated, even conceding the payment by
it to the depositor? As a corrollary to this, of course, is the stark
reality that if there has been a loss, it has been caused by estoppel or
waiver of the depositor. Since the surety can succeed to no better
rights than those held by its subrogor, the former is also effectively
blocked along this path to recovery.
It is submitted that while this may, as stated, be a technically valid
objection to any action by a surety, it loses sight of the practicalities of
the matter. The depositor insures himself against the possibility of loss,
in order to avoid any and all difficulties in this respect. In a very real
sense there is at least the appearance of liability and loss whenever a
forged check is cashed, whatever the legal realities may be. It is this
"loss" which is being insured throughout the whole system, and it is
this loss which should be sufficient to support any claims by the surety.
As will be seen later no injustice is thereby worked, for the claim of
the bank against prior indorsers remains unaffected, and any defenses
assertable against the depositor are good against his subrogee.
The first objection of the writer to the finding of the majority is
directed at the reason for excepting this particular field of insurance
from the normal rules pertaining to insurance. To say merely that the
equities of one party or the other are superior, and therefore subrogation should or should not be allowed, seems tenuous. A more proper
question would seem to be whether the third party is liable. If the
third party is liable, then what difference should it make whether the
surety claims to be subrogated to a contractual right which its insured
possesses against the third party, or whether the claim is based on a
right arising out of the negligent operation of a motor vehicle. To defend on the ground that, in the latter situation, the defendant is truly
a tortfeasor begs the question. The fact remains that the law in both
cases has imposed liability, and there is no requirement that the defendant be morally culpable.
The majority view is all the more weakened when it is remembered
that the defendant itself is usually insured against the same possibility
of loss. In what is perhaps the leading case espousing the minority
view on the subject, the court made the following interesting and
poignant observation:
It would seem that the cases denying subrogation to a surety
of its insured's contractual right against a third party are unrealistic in ignoring the fact that the third party itself is generally
insured by another surety or casualty company against losses
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caused by the neglect of its officers or employees.... In states
which follow the criticized rule the surety or insurer of the
third party. . . would go free of obligation. These cases are
also unrealistic in implying a 'superior equity' in favor of a
third party defendant where a court of equity did not find any
unconscionable conduct at all. As applied in the surety-subrogee
herein the phrase is mere language devoid of
cases discussed
3
meaning.'
In other words, hasn't the majority stretched common sense to the
point of breaking when one compensated surety can assert as a defense
to an action by another compensated surety the fact that the latter has
been compensated, without regard to whether in fact there is any other
defense to an otherwise-defined legal liability?
A third obvious deficiency in the mechanics of the "paid surety"
defense is that it is up to the caprice of the insured to determine where
liability is ultimately to lie. Thus, if the insured arbitrarily chooses to
hold his bank liable on the contract of deposit, irrespective of the fact
that his forgery insurance might cover, the bank is left without any
defenses which it would otherwise possess against the surety. Yet,
under the tenets of the doctrine, because the insured has chosen to
pursue the surety, the bank is afforded a magic defense which becomes
impregnable as to the surety. Practically, of course, such a result
effectually gives the bank the benefit of insurance which its depositor
had the foresight to carry, despite the fact that it has paid no premium
whatsoever, has no other interest or privity in the matter, and has in
fact been the legal cause of the loss. Logically, it seems, the argument
that the surety has no right to be subrogated to contractual rights,
which its insured might possess against its drawee, because its liability
is predicated on a separate and distinct obligation could better be employed. Is it not more sound to say that this is the very reason why
the drawee bank has no legitimate claim to benefits which the depositor
might obtain from his own insurance? It is the bank which has paid
on the forged instrument which is legally liable, albeit on a contract of
deposit, and logically this liability is no different because the depositor
happens to be insured. The claim that the "equities have not been
balanced" is no substitute for reality, and contains no magic potion to
absolve the bank from its otherwise patent liability. Again as stated
by the New Jersey court:
We adhere to the third alternative and give the surety the
benefit of the insured's contractual rights against the third person, first because it is sound in principle, giving force to the
contractual relations of the several parties and, second, because
it is in harmony with the rule adopted in this state in all other
forms of insurance with respect to subrogation. 19
'- Supra. note 9 at 303.
19 Id at 302.
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As still another of the minority courts has said: "And what difference
can it possibly make to the bank whether it pays the loan company on
its unavoidable liability, or pays the title company as assignee of the
loan company, so long as in paying it satisfies a liability it cannot escape." 20 The force of such reasoning in this day and age seems overwhelming ;21 and, until Bank of Fort Mill, it appeared that the ranks
of the minority were destined to grow. 2
II. ASSlGNxMET
It is the purpose of this section to focus attention upon the last
problem faced by the court in Bank of Fort Mill 24 where the surety
claims not only under an alleged right to subrogation, but also under a
formal assignment of all rights from the insured. The argument on
the part of the surety is usually to the effect that since the insured was
Kansas City Title & Trust Co. v. Fourth Nat. Bank in Wichita, Kans., 135
Kans. 414, 10 P.2d 896, 899 (1932).
21 See "The End of the 'Compensated Surety Defense' in Subrogation Cases"
by George C. Bunge and Marvin F. Metge, Vol. 22, Ins. Counsel J. 453, 455,
where the authors give the following explanation of the origin of the doctrine:
A Kentucky court back in 1905, seems to have originated the 'superior equity'
doctrine, in American Bonding Company of Baltimore v. First National
Bank of Covington, Ky. (27 KY. L. REP. 393, 85 S.W. 190). While perhaps
still brooding over the outcome of the Civil War, the court was confronted
with a controversy between a great eastern financial insurance octopus and
a 'pore li'l ol' innocent, well-meaning, Kentucky bank, which at that time,
probably had never heard of forgery insurance. The court, accordingly, administered homespun Kentucky justice in favor of the Kentucky bank. However, the "Compensated Surety Defense" was chiefly developed in decisions
handed down amidst the bank failures and nearfailures of the Great Depression. To hold a bank which was having a hard time to survive, and whose influential stockholders were facing possible double liability on their stock,
liable to the corporate surety as subrogee, in a case where the bank was not
actively at fault, was not in harmony with the temper of those times. The
changed conditions prevailing today have removed many of those emotional
factors, which may have contributed to the development of the "Compensated
Surety Defense."
22 Supra note 1.
2 Boserine v. Maryland Cas. Co., 112 F.2d 409 (8th Cir. 1940), where forgery
insurance is treated as indemnity insurance; First Nat. Bank v. American
Surety Co., 71 Ga. App. 112, 30 S.E.2d 402 (1944) ; First & Tri-State Nat.
Bank & Trust Co. v. Massachusetts Bonding & Ins. Co., 102 Ind. App. 361,
200 N.E. 449 (1936), where the court expressly excluded a minority finding
when a fidelity bond was involved. "The doctrine (subrogation) has . . .
with almost unanimity been held not to apply in favor of surety on a fidelity
bond except only as against persons who participated in the wrongful act of
the wrongdoer." Bank of Fort Mill, involving forgery insurance, is to be contrasted with a fidelity bond situation. In the latter case, it is arguably permissible to deny a surety the right to recover for a wrong perpetrated by his
principal against another party, in no way implicated. Obviously, in forgery
insurance the wrongdoer is not the principal of the surety. Home Ind. Co. v.
State Bank, 233 Iowa 103, 8 N.W. 2d 757 (1943) ; Kansas City Title & Trust
Co. v. Fourth Nat. Bank, 135 Kans. 414, 10 P.2d 896 (1932) ; Royal Ind. Co. v.
Poplar Trust Co., 223 Mo. App. 908, 20 S.W. 2d 971 (1929) ; Standard Acc.
Ins. Co. v. Pellecchia, 15 N.J. 162, 104 A.2d, 288 (1954) ; Maryland Cas. Co. v.
Chase Nat. Bank, 153 Misc. 538, 275 N.Y. Supp. 311 (1934); Nat. Sur. Co.
v. Nat. City Bank, 184 App. Div. 771, 172 N.Y. Snpp. 413 (1918), where surety
on a fidelity bond was allowed to recover, and Liberty Mutual Ins. Co. v.
First Nat. Bank, 151 Tex. 12, 245 S.W.2d 237 (1951).
24 Supra note 1.
20
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the owner of an assignable cause of action against the defendant-drawee
bank, he also had the legal right to assign it to his surety-indemnitor;
furthermore, that because both the cause of action against the bank,
and the assignment thereof, were legal in nature, this subsequent action
by the surety on the assignment was one at law, so as to make inapplicable any of the equitable considerations inherent in pure subrogation.
The defendant bank of course must ask the court to overlook the
maneuver by making any recovery for the surety dependent upon the
traditional concepts of subrogation. The conclusion reached by the
court in Bank of Fort Mill,25 denying the efficacy of the assignment, is
supported by a clear numerical majority.2 6 The theme underlying most
of these cases is perhaps best expressed by the court in Meyers v. Bank
27
of America Nat. Trust & Savings Assn.
Under these cases the conclusion seems inevitable that one
who asserts a right of subrogation, whether by virtue of an
assignment or otherwise, must first show a right in equity to be
entitled to such subrogation, or substitution, and that where such
right is clearly shown by the application of equitable principles,
an assignment adds nothing to his right thereto. Otherwise
stated, where by the application of equitable principles, a surety
has been found not to be entitled to subrogation, an assignment
will not confer upon him the right to be so substituted in an action at law upon the assignment. His rights must be measured
by the application of equitable principles in the first instance, his
recovery being dependable upon a right in equity, and not by
virtue of an asserted legal right under an assignment. 8
Thus the surety is effectively relegated to the position occupied prior to
the attempted assignment. If he is not entitled to be subrogated under
the principles of that doctrine, then an assignment by the insured will
be ineffectual to give him a right of subrogation which he would not
29
otherwise possess.
25 Ibid.
26

United States Fid. & Guaranty Co. v. First Nat. Bank, 172 F.2d 258 (5th Cir.

1949); American Surety Co. v. Bank of California, 135 F.2d 160 (9th Cir.
1943); American Surety Co. v. Lewis State Bank, 58 F.2d 559 (5th Cir.
1932); New York Title & Mort. Co. v. First Nat. Bank, 51 F.2d 485 (8th
Cir. 1931), 77 A.L.R. 1052; Meyers v. Bank of America Nat. Trust & Say.
Assn., 11 Cal. 2d 92, 77 P.2d 1084 (1938) ; Louisville Trust Co. v. Royal Indemnity Co., 230 Ky. 482, 20 S.W.2d 71 (1929); Oxford Production Credit
Assn. v. Bank of Oxford, 196 Miss. 50, 16 So.2d 384 (1944) ; American Bonding Co. v. State Say. Bank, 47 Mont. 332, 133 Pac. 367 (1913), and American
Surety Co. v. Western Surety Co., 71 S.D. 126, 22 N.W.2d 429 (1946).
27 11 Cal.2d 92, 77 P.2d 1084 (1938).
28 Id. at 1086.
29 60 CJ. 749 states: "While the creditor may properly make an assignment
of his rights and remedies where the surety is entitled to be subrogated, the
completion of the surety's subrogation ... is not dependent on the willingness
of the creditor to make an assignment . . . [A]n assignment by the creditor
will be ineffectual to give the surety a right of subrogation he would not
otherwise have."
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3
It may be noted also that the court in Bank of Fort ilila
adopted
l
the reasoning expressed in an earlier case," that when the surety pays
the insured depositor, the payment has the necessary effect of destroying any rights which the depositor might have had against his drawee
bank; this on the theory that to hold otherwise would be to permit
double recovery. We have the anomalous situation, therefore, whereby
the bank is discharged by virtue of a payment made under one contract
(to which the bank is not a party), from any liability under the terms
of its own contract with its depositor. Since an enforceable claim is no
longer in existence against the bank, it must follow under such reasoning that there is precisely nothing which remains to be assigned to the
surety.
Whether correct or not, such a rationale has not gone unchallenged,
either in its reasoning or in its result. In First Nat. Bank of Atlanta v.

American Surety Co.,32 the court allowed the surety to prevail against

the bank under an assignment on the theory that the claim asserted by
the surety was based on a so-called "conventional subrogation" as opposed to "legal subrogation." The former, the court explained, is
synonymous with an assignment and has as an essential ingredient, the
agreement of the parties whereby the surety pays with the understanding that it is to be subrogated to the rights of the insured against all
third parties. Apparently the agreement itself was enough to negate
the idea that the surety was depending upon equity for its action, so
that the court felt free to apply straight legal principles free of equitable limitations. The same result, if not flowing from precisely similar reasoning, has been reached elsewhere. 33 It is submitted that in the
final analysis and disregarding needless terminology, these courts are
merely expressing a willingness to break with the majority. Emphasis
placed by a court on the supposed intent of the parties, or on the fact
that the surety is claiming under its agreement, as opposed to pure
subrogation, is only incidental to this willingness to depart from the
20 Supra note 1.
31 American Surety Co. v. Bank of California, 133 F.2d 160 (9th Cir. 1943).
3271 Ga. App. 112, 30 S.E.2d 402 (1944).
3-3
Metropolitan Cas. Ins. Co. v. First Nat. Bank in Detroit, 261 Mich. 450, 246
N.W. 178 (1933). See also National Surety Co. v. Bankers Trust Co., 210 Iowa
323, 228 N.W. 635, 636 (1930) where the court expressed the feeling that
payment by the surety in no way affected the liability of the bank to its depositor, and that the possibility of double payment was negated by the assignment to the surety by the assured after payment. "The (defendant bank)
• ..was an entire stranger to the contract between the annuity company and
the surety company. The fidelity . . . contract was one of indemnity, and
payment of the indemnity was not a payment of the bank's liability to the

annuity company. The plaintiff surety company did not pay the bank's lia-

bility, and did not, impliedly or otherwise, intend to do so." Other cases enforcing assignments are: Royal Indemnify Company v. Poplar Bluff Trust

Co., 223 Mo. App. 908, 20 S.W.2d 971 (1929); National Surety Co. v. Na-

tional City Bank of Brooklyn, 184 App. Div. 771, 172 N.Y.Supp. 413 (1918), and
Liberty Mutual Ins. Co. v. First Nat. Bank in Dallas, 151 Tex. 12, 245 S.W.2d
237 (1951).
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past. As mentioned earlier, under the traditional view, the willingness
of the insured to make an assignment to his surety is immaterial, for
the doctrine operates automatically and irrespective of a written or
oral assignment. 34 To this writer the departure seems logical. There
can be little doubt that the debt owed by the bank to its depositor is
legally assignable to anyone other than the surety. Why then an exception in the case of the surety ? - Had the surety not paid the depositor,
and yet taken an assignment, it would be just another third party and
its rights as assignee unassailable. Under what theory can this forfeiture by payment occur? The surety has simply advanced the very
amount for which the bank itself is legally liable to its depositor. Yet,
by some magic, this works itself into a defense to an action for breach
of a contract of deposit.
To escape the stigma of the "paid surety" defense, sureties have
occasionally attempted still other devices. It can be said with relative
certainty that once the court is committed to the defense, the matter
becomes a closed issue, and such things as loan receipts, 36 or an agreement by the surety to pay the claim of the insured if the latter is unable to recover from the bank,37 will, like the assignment already discussed, fail to sway the court from its chosen way.
III.

ELECTION OF REmEDIES

A small number of American courts, in denying the right of the
paid surety to be subrogated, have rested the decision on a so-called
election of remedies theory.3s The basic proposition seems to be that
when the depositor-insured discovers its loss, with full knowledge of
the details, it is faced with a choice of two remedies. Alternatively, it
may make demand on the bank, upon the theory that when the bank
paid the instrument on the forged endorsement, it paid out its own
money and not that of the depositor; or the depositor may affirm the
action of the bank in paying out the money on the forged instrument
and proceed either against the forger (on the ground that the forger
C.J. 749.
35 See Grubnau v. Centennial Nat. Bank, 279 Pa. 501, 124 Atl. 142, 144 (1924),
wherein it is said in speaking about the assignment made to the surety by
the insured: "Nor is it a case of subrogation, wherein the equities of the
bank may be said to exceed those of the insurer. Any person could have
purchased the depositor's rigqht against the bank, and there was no reason
why the insurance conmpany should not do so." [Italics supplied].
36 Hensley-Johnson Motors v. Citizens Nat. Bank, 122 Cal. App. 2d 22, 264 P.2d
973 (1954); J. G. Boswell Co. v. W. D. Felder & Co., 103 Cal. App. 2d 767,
230 P.2d 386 (1951), and American Alliance Ins. Co. v. Capitol Nat. Bank, 75
Cal. App. 2d 787, 171 P.2d 449 (1946).
37 Hensley-Johnson Motors v. Citizens Nat. Bank, supra,note 36.
38 United States Fidelity & Guar. Co. v. First Nat. Bank in Dallas, 172 F2d
258 (5th Cir. 1949); Amer. Surety Co. v. Bank of Calif., 133 F.2d 160 (9th
Cir. 1943); Hensley-Johnson Motors v. Citizens Nat. Bank, 122 Cal. App.
2d 22, 264 P.2d 973 (1954), and Liberty Mutual Ins. Co. v. First Nat. Bank in
Dallas, 239 S.W.2d 738 (Tex. Civ. App. 1951), rev'd., 151 Tex. 12, 246 S.W.2d
237 (1951).
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had embezzeled or otherwise obtained money belonging to the depositor) or the surety. The former remedy is founded upon the idea that
the money of the depositor is still in the bank and the bank must pay it
over on demand. The latter remedy, it is stated, necessarily must be
based upon the premise that the depositor's money actually left the
possession of the bank and came into the hands of the forger; for to
allow a recovery on a surety bond the employee must have embezzeled
money belonging to his employer. 39 Since the depositor has chosen to
recover from the surety, he is deemed to have made an election of
remedies so as to bar any further action against the drawee bank. The
depositor himself has no action against the drawee bank, so it follows
there is nothing to which the surety may claim to be subrogated.
A number of cases from various jurisdictions have held that to
choose between an action against the faithless employee and an action
against the bank, amounts to an election of remedies, so that an election having been made, the plaintiff-depositor may not later pursue
another remedy against the bank.40 But the application of this doctrine
to cases under discussion herein has been thoroughly and effectively
attacked to such an extent that it is doubtful whether its use will expand beyond those jurisdictions wherein it is already employed. In
effectively reversing an earlier Federal decision, 41 the Supreme Court
of Texas stated:
Those courts which hold that the depositor by collecting from
the surety has made an election of remedies must find something
inconsistent in the right of the depositor to proceed against both
the surety and the bank ....

careful analysis of the relationship

of the parties fails to satisfy us that this inconsistency actually
exists in the position of the depositor. The indemnity policy
does not insure the depositor against loss through the acquisition
by an employee of depositor's money. It insures the depositor
against loss sustained by reason of the dishonest acts of the
employee. The dishonest acts of the employee here were in his
fraudulent procuring of depositor's checks payable to fictitious
payees, the forging of the names of the payees and the cashing
of such checks. But if the sequence of events had stopped at
that point depositor would have suffered no loss though the dishonest employee would have benefitted by ill-gotten gain from
his dishonest acts. Depositor did not even suffer a loss when
Bank honored the checks and paid them. Depositor's loss occurred only when Bank charged the checks against depositor's
-9 United States Fidelity & Guar. Co. v. First Nat. Bank in Dallas, 172 F.2d
258 (5th Cir. 1949).
4o Fowler v. Bowery Sav. Bank, 113 N.Y. 450, 21 N.E. 172, 173 (1889), where
the court said: "Nothing could be more inconsistent than an action against
Flynn (forger) on the ground that money due to the plaintiff had been paid
to him, and an action against the bank on the ground that it had not paid the
deposit, and still remained debtor therefore." See also Crook v. First Nat.
Bank of Baraboo, 83 Wis. 31, 52 N.W. 1131 (1892).
41 United States Fidelity & Guar. Co. v. First Nat. Bank in Dallas, supra, note 39.
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account without legal right to do so and in breach of its contract.
Accordingly, the position of depositor in making claim against
Fidelity (surety) was that by virtue of the dishonest acts of
depositor's employee, Bank had been led to pay out its own
money but that Bank had unlawfully and wrongfully charged
the amount against and deducted the same from depositor's
account thereby causing it a loss. Until Bank could be compelled to restore the account to its proper status ... (depositor)
.. .had suffered a loss. This position is wholly consistent with
the position taken with bank to the effect that it had paid out
its own funds and not those of . . . (depositor) .42
Another leading case in opposition to the theory of election of remedies is Grubnau v. Centennial Nat. Bank,43 which emphasized the
severability of the two liabilities-the bank to its depositor, and the
surety to its assured. The position was taken that the legal status of
the depositor was not really that of a party holding a claim against
two indemnitors, in the sense that the payment by one would act as
an offset to any suit against the other. To the contrary, the court
reasoned, the depositor had a claim first against his surety; secondly,
against the bank which was violating its contract of deposit. The remedies could not really be considered in the same right, since it could not
44
The
be said that the insurance was "in ease of the bank's mistake."
court felt that "[I]t would be a novel proposition to hold that an insurance contract could reach out to indemnify a stranger, in no way a
party to the insurance, whose wrongful act caused the insurance company to pay the loss to the insured which would not have occurred but
for the wrongul act."4' 5 Careful analysis of the opinion would seem
to indicate that the court did not really supply a technical argument to
refute an equally technical doctrine. Indeed it is questionable whether
erudition would be at all effective, in light of the obvious uncertainty
and lack of unanimity surrounding the doctrine of election of remedies
in its own area. Any court attempting a refutation must face indiscriminate usage of waiver, 46 estoppel,4 7 election and the like. The
42Liberty Mutual Ins. Co. v. First Nat. Bank in Dallas, 151 Tex. 12, 245
S.W.2d 237, 243 (1951).
43279 Pa. 501, 124 Atl. 142 (1924).
44 Id. at 143.
45 Ibid.
46Hensley-Johnson Motors v. Citizens Nat. Bank, supra note 38: "[W]hen
plaintiff accepted the agreement from the surety, it waived its claim against
defendant."
47 United States Fidelity & Guar. Co. v. First Nat. Bank in Dallas, supra, note
39 at 262: "the election . .. to pursue to a successful conclusion its right
against the bonding company estopped it, we think, from asserting any claim
against the drawee bank." The court in the Liberty Mutual Ins. Co. v. First
Nat. Bank in Dallas, supra, note 42 at 243, had the following to say about
the estoppel argument: "Again it is sometimes said that having proceeded
against the surety the depositor is estopped to proceed against the bank. Any
right that Bank had here cannot have been prejudiced by Liberty Mutual's
(depositor) collection from Fidelity. Bank continues to urge against Fidelity's
(surety) suit all the defenses it had against Liberty Mutual and it still has
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doctrine is just vague enough that a court so disposed can readily apply
it. It would seem, however, that the strongest rebuttal of the theory
lies in the simple fact that, when the suit is on the deposit contract, the
fact of deposit itself will support the recovery and it is not necessary
for the depositor to allege possession of his money by the bank in order
to recover.
CONCLUSION

At the risk of being tautological, suffice to say that the doctrine of
the "paid surety" has no sound place in modern legal thinking. The
fact always remains that the party cashing a forged instrument is
legally liable (not because he cashed it, but because he failed to account
for the deposit), and the fortuitous act of a depositor in insuring himindependently with a surety should in no way effect an otherwise
absolute legal liability.
AMAURICE

J.

GARVEY

the same right it always had to seek recoupment from prior endorsers or to

pursue its remedies against the defaulting employee." This is to say, logically,
that there can hardly be an estoppel if

there is no detriment. Since the

drawee bank has none of its rights or defenses affected, by allowing subrogation, where is the detriment?

